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Abstract
The large empirical conict literature has established that there is a strong negative
link between economic variables and the onset of an armed civil conict. However, it
has been di¢ cult to demonstrate a clear causality between poor economic performance
and increased risk of conict because of potential endogeneity issues, especially for
large country samples. Most existing studies that analyse the causal links focus on the
e¤ects of economic growth on conict, even though conventional conict studies nd
the strongest relationship for income levels. In this article, we use three new exogenous
instruments for income per capita, based on historical data for mailing times, telegram
charges and urbanization rates. Using instrumental variables methods and global panel
data for the period 1946-2014, we show that the negative e¤ect of income per capita on
the probability of conict onset is consistently strong and larger than in conventional
estimations using pooled ordinary least square regressions.
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1 Introduction
Economic variables have long been established in the empirical conict literature as the
most robust predictors of armed civil conict (see e.g., Collier and Hoe­ er, 2002, 2004;
Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). However, although the link between
economic variables and armed civil conict seems strong, the causality is uncertain due to
endogeneity issues, mainly arising from reverse causality and omitted variable bias. Several
recent articles use 2SLS estimations, either with weather-based instruments (e.g., Bohlken
and Sergenti 2010; Bergholt and Lujala 2012; Hodler and Raschky 2014; Sarsons 2015), or
with commodity-price-based instruments (Brückner and Ciccone 2010; Bazzi and Blattman
2014; Berman et al. 2017), and analyze the e¤ects of economic shocks on the likelihood of
armed civil conict, often with regional country-samples.1
This article contributes to this strand of literature by employing three new exogenous
instruments for income per capita that can be used for a global sample of countries in armed
conict studies. Our instruments are based on historical data from the early 20th century on
mailing times, telegram charges, and urbanization rates. They have several advantages over
those used in other studies. First, they instrument income levels, while the vast majority of
the existing papers that use two-stage least squares (2SLS) to explicitly model the intervening
economic variable focus on income growth. The distinction is crucial since income levels
have proven to be the more robust explanatory variable of the two in the conventional
conict literature (see e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006). Second,
our instruments are available for up to 179 countries, giving our results excellent external
validity and allowing us to draw conclusions on global average causal e¤ects. Finally, our
instruments do not rely on climate-based or commodity-price data like most of the current
instruments for economic conditions, but instead use new sources of exogenous variation.
Using our three instruments in pooled 2SLS estimations, we conrm the importance of
income levels for explaining the onset of armed civil conict, and nd that the magnitude
1See the recent survey by Couttenier and Soubeyran (2015).
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of the e¤ect is substantially larger than in conventional pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimations.
2 Methodology and data description
[Table 1 about here]
We follow the literature and explain the onset of armed conict in year t in country i
with income per capita levels and a vector of other covariates X according to:
conflictit = a+ 1  incomepcit + 2 Xit + it; (1)
where a is the constant term and  the error term. Conict is a zero-one dummy taken
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conict Database v.4-2014a (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson
and Wallensteen 2015). It indicates the onset of a new armed civil conict with over 25 battle
related deaths or reactivation of a conict after more than two years since the last observed
ghting. Information for (ln) income per capita and (ln) population size comes from the
Maddison dataset (Bolt and van Zanden 2013).2 Other covariates include a polity measure
and its square from the Polity IV dataset p4v2015 (Marshall et al, 2013); ethnic polarization
(Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005); mountainousness (Fearon and Laitin, 2003); (ln) oil
reserves (Cotet and Tsui, 2013); the time in years since a countrys independence or since
1945; a dummy for the post-Cold War period; a dummy equal to unity if a country was a
colony in 1903 (own coding); and a dummy variable for historical conict between 1816-1910
(own coding based on the Correlates of War dataset). The last two dummy variables are
included in tests of instrument exogeneity, explained in more detail below. Note that we lag
all time-varying covariates except the post Cold War dummy by one year.
To take into account the likely endogeneity of income per capita, we follow Miguel et
2We also used only the Penn World Tables (PWT 8.0, Feenstra et al. 2013) for the economic and
population variables. The sample loses three countries and over 1000 observations, but the results are
remarkably similar (not shown).
3
al (2004) and choose linear, pooled two-stage least squares (2SLS) as our approach3 for the
following rst-stage estimation:
incomepcit = c+ 1  Ii + 2 Xit + "it: (2)
We have a total of three di¤erent exogenous instruments I, which allows us to achieve
a strong rst-stage identication and to test for overidentifying restrictions.4 Our dataset
covers the period 1946-2010 and includes up to 9,253 country-year observations and 179
countries. Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.
Exogenous instruments. Our rst instrument is based on mailing times in 1903 from
either London or Washington, D.C. whichever is faster to the rest of the world. The two
cities were chosen as they were the capitals of the worlds most powerful economy at the time
and of the worlds soon-to-be most powerful economy, respectively. We used data on mailing
times and distances for regular correspondence from Post O¢ ce Department (1903) and Post
O¢ ce (1903),5 supplemented by own calculations for missing cases. The "mailing speeds"
are calculated as miles covered per "mailing day". We then took the natural logarithm to
construct our nal measure, Mailingspeed. Mailing times are positively linked to economic
development: not only did it take longer for correspondence to reach the more remote parts
of the world; but at equal distances, letters reached a more developed and better-connected
country before its "backwater" counterpart.
The second instrument is international Telegram charges from Britain in (ln) pence in
1903, from Post O¢ ce (1903) and again supplemented by own calculations for missing cases.
Telegram pricing principles were similar across the globe: they depended on distance and the
number of words in the message, and also included labor costs right down to nal delivery. A
3We do not use country xed e¤ects. See Beck and Katz (2001) for a theoretical argument against xed
e¤ects in this context. A recent example in the conict literature that does not use country xed e¤ects is
given by Esteban et al (2012).
4Detailed descriptions of the instruments will be made available by the authors in an online codebook.
5We are grateful to Jenny Lynch from the US Postal Service and to sta¤ at The Royal Mail Archive for
their help.
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stated charge would apply to the rst ten words together, and then to each single additional
word (Ross 1928, Downey 2002). The resulting pattern meant that it cost less to send a
telegram from London to Australia than to the West African coast, for example, so that
telegram charges should be negatively related to income levels.
Our third and nal instrument is the Urbanization rate (for towns 20000 or larger) in
1920, taken mainly from UN (1969) and supplemented by information from McEvedy and
Jones (1978), the Statesmans Yearbook (1922), and Bairoch (1988). Historical urbanization
is strongly linked to the level of economic development at the time. We expect that higher
urbanization rates in 1920 are related to higher income per capita in more recent decades.
Urbanization from a century ago is unlikely to a¤ect conict after WWII directly. Also,
post-war urbanization patterns particularly in the developing world di¤ered signicantly
from those seen earlier in the century (Bairoch 1988). So while cities may often be the
epicenters of social unrest today, urbanization rates no longer have the strong positive link
with economic development that they used to have.
All three of our instruments could conceivably be correlated with colonial status: colonies
might on average be more prone to conict after WWII as well as more developed, which
would weaken our exclusion restriction. Similarly, historical conict could be correlated
both with development level and more recent conict probability. In our instrument validity
checks, we therefore add dummies for colonial status (i.e., whether a country was a colony
in 1903, at the time the telegram charges and mailing speeds were measured) and for the
occurrence of an armed conict in the present-day country in the period between 1816-1910.
[Table 2 about here]
In the reduced-form estimations in Table 2, we use variables from a parsimonious baseline
specication including (ln) population and the dummy for a conict in the previous year.
Each instrument has the right sign and is highly signicant when introduced on its own
(columns 1-3). The instruments are not all individually signicant when added together
(column 4), but they are jointly highly signicant (the null of joint insignicance is rejected
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at the 1% level).6 Population and lagged conict have the expected signs, though only
population is signicant. This rst check supports the validity of our instruments. We also
provide results of several statistical tests of instrument strength with the 2SLS estimation
results below, and show some sensitivity checks.
3 Results
[Table 3 about here]
Table 3 rst shows results using pooled Probit and OLS to conrm the standard nding
of a highly signicant negative coe¢ cient for income per capita (columns 1-3). The remain-
ing columns show the results of 2SLS estimations, initially using only one instrument at a
time (columns 4-6), and nally using all three instruments together (columns 7-8). Income
per capita is negative and highly signicant across all specications. The increase in the
magnitude of the per capita coe¢ cients in 2SLS estimations suggests that the upward bias
in OLS estimations due to reverse causality is much smaller than the probable downward bias
caused by omitted variables. The other explanatory variables are in line with the existing
literature on armed civil conicts.
Instrument validity. Looking at the rst-stage information in the lower section of
Table 3, all instruments have the expected sign and are highly signicant both on their
own (columns 4-6) and together (columns 7-8). Test statistics further conrm instrument
strength and validity; tests based on Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics (not shown) also
reject that we have weak instruments.
[Figure 1 about here]
As an illustration of the explanatory power of our instruments, Figure 1 depicts scatter-
plots for the rst-stage regression ts of income per capita on our exogenous instruments,
based on specications (4)-(6) in Table 3. The plots illustrate the good performance of our
6Angrist and Pischke (2009) discuss the importance of joint over individual signicance in reduced-form
estimations when there are several exogenous instruments.
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instruments, though plot c) shows that Singapore (top-right) is a clear outlier in urbaniza-
tion rates. Plot d) accordingly shows the same regression specication without Singapore,
giving qualitatively unaltered results.
[Table 4 about here]
As a further test of the validity of our exogenous instruments, in Table 4 we add them in
pairs (columns 1-3), which does not alter results and conrms IV strength. In column (4),
we add a dummy for colonial status in 1903 and for historical conict. The results clearly
show that our instruments remain strong; that the main result for income per capita is not
a¤ected; and that neither former colonies nor countries that saw conict further back in time
were more likely to have an armed conict onset after WWII.
4 Conclusion
We introduce three new instruments for income per capita and use these to test the rela-
tionship between income levels and the likelihood of armed civil conict. We conrm that
lower income levels increase the risk of conict onset, and show that the e¤ect is larger than
with OLS.
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Figure 1: Scatter plots of rst-stage results for exogenous instruments. Plots a)-c)
correspond to specications (4)-(6) in Table 2. Plot d) corresponds to specication (6) in
Table 2 without Singapore. Lines show regression ts.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Conict onset 9,253 0.034 0.181 0 1
ln Income p.c. 7,861 7.969 1.083 5.315 10.667
ln Population 8,545 9.02 1.57 4.824 14.107
Polity 9,155 10.608 7.460 0 20
ln Oil reserves 5,738 -4.579 5.274 -9.210 5.596
Mountainousness 8,888 18.288 21.665 0 94
Ethnic polarization 7,474 0.5191 0.242 0.017 0.982
Yrs since independence 9,253 29.683 18.63 1 69
Colony 9,253 0.397 0.489 0 1
Conict 1816-1910 9,250 0.541 0.498 0 1
Telegram 9,253 38.137 33.373 0.5 171
Mailingspeed 9,253 348.819 155.060 75.702 1,000
Urbanization1920 9,253 12.690 14.065 0 90
Notes: For easier interpretation, Telegram and Mailingspeed are not reported in natural
logs.
Table 2: Reduced-form estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mailingspeed -0.0176*** -0.0056
(-3.160) (-0.872)
Telegram 0.0077*** 0.0028
(4.180) (1.245)
Urbanization -0.0009*** -0.0008***
(-4.620) (-3.686)
Conictt 1 0.0228 0.0216 0.0178 0.0171
(1.490) (1.446) (1.222) (1.163)
Populationt 1 0.0115*** 0.0108*** 0.0114*** 0.0120***
(3.652) (3.457) (3.670) (3.850)
Observations 8,535 8,535 8,535 8,535
Countries 171 171 171 171
R2 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.018
Notes: The dependent variable is onset of an armed civil conict. All specications include a constant term
(not shown). S.e. are clustered at the country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, **
p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table 3: Income and armed civil conict onset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Prob it OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Incom e p.c.t 1 -0 .23*** -0 .015*** -0 .024*** -0 .018*** -0 .020*** -0 .021*** -0 .020*** -0 .032***
(-6 .58) (-6 .02) (-3 .77) (-3 .39) (-4 .53) (-6 .14) (-6 .15) (-3 .17)
Populationt 1 0.14*** 0.011*** 0.0069 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.0055
(4.40) (3 .26) (1 .46) (3 .34) (3 .33) (3 .35) (3 .35) (1 .33)
Conictt 1 0.12 0.014 -0 .0056 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.011 -0 .0095
(0.96) (1 .00) (-0 .38) (0 .82) (0 .77) (0 .72) (0 .75) (-0 .67)
Polityt 1 0.0043** 0.0034
(2.01) (1 .45)
Polity2t 1 -0 .0002 -0 .0001
(-1 .50) (-0 .77)
Mountainousness -0 .0002 -0 .00023
(-1 .35) (-1 .37)
Ethnic p olarization -0 .0023 -0 .0050
(-0 .16) (-0 .33)
O il reservest 1 0.0033*** 0.0041***
(3.84) (3 .64)
Post Cold War -0 .012 -0 .014*
(-1 .41) (-1 .68)
Yrs since indep endence 0.0005* 0.0007**
(1.96) (2 .25)
Observations 7817 7817 4481 7817 7817 7817 7817 4481
Countries 161 161 94 161 161 161 161 94
R2 0.019 0.025
First-stage results
Telegram -9.65 -3 .04 -1 .71
Mailingsp eed 7.30 2.96 3.91
Urbanization 7.29 6.18 8.58
F-statistic 53.3 93.2 53.2 43.2 30.7
Partia l R2 0.18 0.25 0.36 0.44 0.40
Hansen J p-value 0.75 0.72
Notes: The dependent variable is onset of an armed civil conict. Column (1) shows pooled probit esti-
mations; columns (2)-(3) pooled OLS; columns (4)-(8) pooled 2SLS. All specications include a constant
term (not shown). First stage information includes exogenous instrumentst-statistics, partial R-squareds,
excluded instrumentsF-statistics, and Hansen J statistic p-value. S.e. are clustered at the country level.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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Table 4: IV sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Income p.c.t 1 -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.019***
(-4.75) (-6.06) (-6.19) (-4.32)
Populationt 1 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(3.34) (3.35) (3.35) (2.96)
Conictt 1 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010
(0.79) (0.74) (0.75) (0.74)
Colony 0.0049
(0.50)
Conict 1816-1910 0.0053
(0.95)
Observations 7817 7817 7817 7817
Countries 161 161 161 161
First-stage results
Telegram -5.79 -4.56 -3.09
Mailingspeed 3.38 4.65 2.09
Urbanization 6.33 6.63 7.82
F-statistic 56.8 61.8 47.8 32.6
Partial R2 0.29 0.42 0.41 0.33
Hansen J p-value 0.66 0.64 0.47 0.85
Notes: The dependent variable is onset of an armed civil conict. All estimations are pooled 2SLS. All
specications include a constant term (not shown). First stage information includes exogenous instruments
t-statistics, partial R-squareds, excluded instrumentsF-statistics, and Hansen J statistic p-value. S.e. are
clustered at the country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
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